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Digital image manipulation software is now readily available on personal computers. It is therefore very simple to tamper with
any image and make it available to others. Insuring digital image integrity has therefore become a major issue. Watermarking has
become a popular technique for copyright enforcement and image authentication. The aim of this paper is to present an overview
of emerging techniques for detecting whether image tampering has taken place. Compared to the techniques and protocols for
security usually employed to perform this task, the majority of the proposed methods based on watermarking, place a particular
emphasis on the notion of content authentication rather than strict integrity. In this paper, we introduce the notion of image
content authentication and the features required to design an eﬀective authentication scheme. We present some algorithms, and
introduce frequently used key techniques.
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Basic watermarking principles
The digital revolution, the explosion of communication net-
works, and the increasingly growing passion of the general
public for new information technologies lead to exponential
growth of multimedia document traﬃc (image, text, audio,
video, etc.). This phenomenon is now so important that in-
suring protection and control of the exchanged data has be-
come a major issue. Indeed, from their digital nature, multi-
media documents can be duplicated, modified, transformed,
and diﬀused very easily. In this context, it is important to
develop systems for copyright protection, protection against
duplication, and authentication of content. Watermarking
seems to be the alternative solution for reinforcing the se-
curity of multimedia documents.
The aim of watermarking is to include subliminal infor-
mation (i.e., imperceptible) in a multimedia document to
ensure a security service or simply a labelling application. It
would be then possible to recover the embedded message at
any time, even if the document was altered by one or more
nondestructive attacks, whether malicious or not.
Until now, the majority of publications in the field of
watermarking mainly address the copyright of still images.
Other security services, such as image content authentica-
tion, are still marginal and many fundamental questions
remain open. We may wonder, for example, whether it is
preferable to use a fragile watermark, a robust watermark,
or even use a completely diﬀerent technique. Furthermore,
an authentication service partially calls into question the set-
tings commonly established in watermarking copyright pro-
tection, particularly in terms of the quantity and nature of
hidden information (for copyright, the mark is independent
of the image and is usually a 64-bit identifier), as well as in
terms of robustness.
1.2. Notions of integrity
In the security community, an integrity service is unambigu-
ously defined as one, which insures that the sent and received
data are identical. This binary definition can also be applica-
ble to images, however it is too strict and not well adapted to
this type of digital document. Indeed, in real life situations,
images will be transformed. Their pixel values will therefore
be modified but not the actual semantic meaning of the im-
age. In other words, the problem of image authentication
concerns the image content, for example, when modifica-
tions of the document may change its meaning or visually
degrade it. In order to provide an authentication service for
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still images, it is important to distinguish between malicious
manipulations, which consist of changing the content of the
original image such as captions or faces, and manipulations
related to the use of an image, such as format conversion,
compression, filtering, and so on.
Unfortunately this distinction is not always clear, it partly
depends on the type of image and its use. Indeed the in-
tegrity criteria of an artistic masterpiece and a medical im-
age will not be the same. In the first case, a JPEG com-
pression will not aﬀect the perception of the image, whereas
in the second case it may discard some of the fine details
which would render the image totally useless. Even if the
scope of this paper is the authentication of multimedia im-
ages for general purpose, it is interesting to notice that there
exist methods dedicated to very specific integrity services,
such as the authentication of medical or military images.
Indeed these images should be modified by no means (in-
cluding watermarking) and a strict definition of integrity
is then required. The first class of these methods is invert-
ible watermarking scheme [1], in the sense that, if the image
is deemed authentic, the distortion due to the watermark-
ing process can be removed to obtain the original image.
Another approach [2] consists in separating the image into
two zones: a region of interest (ROI) which is the part of
the image used for the diagnostic, where data integrity must
be strictly controlled, and a region of noninterest (where
distortions are allowed) used to embed the authentication
data.
1.3. Classical examples ofmaliciousmanipulations
It is a well-known saying that an image is worth a thousand
words. Images tend to have more impact on people than text,
as it is easier to disregard the content of textual information
than to question the origin and authenticity of a photograph.
It used to be stated that the camera could not lie. However,
it is now possible to edit pictures easily and at very little cost.
The resulting images can have such a high quality that they
appear to be genuine.
In this context, it is obvious that an image authentica-
tion service cannot be used to verify the events, but it may be
able to detect an a posteriori alteration to an image (i.e., the
diﬀerence between the photograph as taken, and its released
version).
Recently, a picture published on the front page of the
Austrian newspaperNeue Kronen Zeitung, claims to illustrate
that the demonstrators opposed to Haider’s party joining the
government were aggressive.
Using digital modification, the picture was cropped and
the distance between a demonstrator and a policemanwas re-
duced, so that it seemed that the policeman had been struck.
In reality, there was approximately two meters between the
two persons as certified by the original picture published by
the Reuters agency http://www.reuters.com.
The use of image, audio, or video elements in legal sit-
uations becomes more and more questionable at a time
where surveillance video cameras are increasingly common
in towns and other public places.
1.4. Generic image authentication system
Various formulations have been proposed by Wu and Liu [3]
and Lin and Chang [4].
However, we propose a generic image authentication sys-
tem. To be eﬀective, a system must satisfy the following cri-
teria:
(1) Sensitivity: the system must be sensitive to malicious
manipulations (e.g., modifying the image meaning) such as
cropping or altering the image in specific areas.
(2) Tolerance: the system must tolerate some loss of in-
formation (originating from lossy compression algorithms)
and more generally nonmalicious manipulations (generated,
e.g., by multimedia providers or fair users).
(3) Localisation of altered regions: the system should be
able to locate precisely any malicious alteration made to the
image and verify other areas as authentic.
(4) Reconstruction of altered regions: the system may
need the ability to restore, even partially, altered or destroyed
regions in order to allow the user to know what was the orig-
inal content of the manipulated areas.
In addition, some technical features must be taken into
account:
(i) Storage: authentication data should be embedded in
the image, such as a watermark, rather than in a separate file,
as is the case with an external signature.
(ii) Mode of extraction: depending on whether authenti-
cation data is dependent or not on the image, a full-blind or
a semiblind mode of extraction is required. It is quite obvi-
ous that a nonblind mode of extraction does not make sense
for an authentication service, since the original image is nec-
essary.
(iii) Asymmetrical algorithm: contrary to classical secu-
rity services such as copyright protection, an authentication
service requires an asymmetrical watermarking (or encryp-
tion) algorithm (i.e., only the author of an image can secure
it, but any user must be able to check the content of an im-
age).
(iv) Visibility: authentication data should be invisible un-
der normal observation. It is a question of making sure that
the visual impact of watermarking is as weak as possible so
that the watermarked image remains faithful to the original.
Recently, a new approach based on invertible algorithms [1]
has been proposed. The basic idea is to be able to remove
the distortions due to the watermarking process to obtain the
original image data. Obviously perfect in terms of visibility,
it is important to note that such an approach could create a
very attractive context for attackers.
(v) Robustness and security: it must not be possible for
authentication data to be forged or manipulated.
(vi) Protocols: protocols are an important aspect of any
image authentication system, in particular avoid protecting a
corrupted picture. It is obvious that any algorithm alone can
not guarantee the security of the system. It is necessary to
define a set of scenari and specifications describing the oper-
ation and rules of the system, such as the management of the
keys or the communication protocols between owner, seller,
client, and so forth.
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2. STATE OF THE ART
2.1. Introduction
In this section we do not aim to draw up a complete and ex-
haustive overview of all image authentication methods. We
therefore decided to exclude from this paper any approach
which does not include a watermarking aspect, in particu-
lar, approaches based on external signature, such as classical
cryptographically secure hash functions like MD-4, MD-5
(message digest), CRC-32 (32-bit cyclic redundancy check),
SHA-1 (secure hash algorithm) [5], and so on. Interested
readers are invited to refer to [6, 7, 8, 9, 10].
Nevertheless, we present a general outline of emerging
techniques in order to introduce the key concepts associated
with this type of service.
Image authentication systems can be classified in several
ways according to whether they ensure strict integrity or con-
tent authentication, and also according to the storage mode
of data authentication (i.e., watermark or external signature).
In this paper, we classify the watermarking methods into two
categories (fragile watermarks and semifragile watermarks),
even if the concept of robustness is sometimes ambiguous.
2.2. Fragile watermarks
2.2.1 Principle
Most methods currently proposed for providing image au-
thentication are based on a fragile watermark in opposition
to robust watermark classically used for copyright protec-
tion. The basic idea underlying these techniques is to in-
sert a specific watermark (generally independent of the im-
age data [11]) so that any attempt to alter the content of an
image will also alter the watermark itself (Figure 1). There-
fore, the authentication process consists of locating water-
mark distortions in order to locate the regions of the im-
age that have been tampered with. The major drawback of
these approaches is that it is diﬃcult to distinguish between
malicious and nonmalicious attacks (e.g., most fragile meth-
ods consider a lossy compressed image as a tampered image,
whereas the semantic of the image is unchanged).
2.2.2 Embedding check-sums in LSB
One of the first techniques used for image tampering detec-
tion was based on inserting check-sums into the least signif-
icant bits (LSB) of the image data. The algorithm proposed
by Walton [12] in 1995 consists in selecting, according to a
secret key, pseudorandom groups of pixels. The check-sum
value is obtained by summing the numbers determined by
the 7 most significant bits (MSB) of selected pixels. Then the
check-sum bits are embedded in the LSB. The basic version
of this algorithm can be summarized as follows.
Algorithm 1 (embedding process).
(1) Let N be a large integer;
(2) divide the image into 8 × 8 blocks;
(3) for each block B:











Figure 1: Generic fragile watermark scheme: (a) Image security. (b)
Authenticity verification.
(i) define a pseudorandomwalk through all 64 pixels, ac-
cording to the secret key and the block number, and
denote the pixels as (p1, p2, . . . , p64);
(ii) generate a pseudorandom sequence of 64 integers
(a1, a2, . . . , a64) comparable in size to N ;









where g(pj) is the grey-level of the pixel pj (deter-
mined by the 7 MSB);
(iv) encrypt the binary form of S;
(v) embed the encrypted sequence into the LSB of the im-
age block.
The checking process is similar to the embedding pro-
cess. It consists in comparing, for each block, the check-sum
determined by the MSB of the tested image with the original
check-sum value recovered from the LSB.
The main advantages of this method are that it does not
produce visible changes in the image and provides a very high
probability of tamper detection. For example, if we swap only
two pixels of any block, the check-sum will be modified be-
cause each pixel pj of the block is multiplied by a diﬀerent
coeﬃcient aj . Furthermore the random walk of the pixels pj
and the coeﬃcients aj are block dependent, thus making it
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impossible to swap or duplicate entire blocks without mak-
ing undetected changes. One of the drawbacks of this tech-
nique is that it is possible to swap homologous blocks (that
are blocks of the same position) from two authenticated im-
ages protected with the same key. A simple solution to this
type of attack is to make the watermark dependent on the
image content. This could be achieved using the robust bit
extraction algorithm proposed by Fridrich [13].
2.2.3 Self-embedding
Fridrich andGoljan [14] propose an original method for self-
embedding an image into itself as a mean of protecting the
image content. This method also allows the regions of the
image that have been tampered with, cropped, or replaced,
to be partially repaired. The basic principle of this method is
to embed a compressed version of the image into the LSB of
its pixels. As in all watermarking methods based on LSB em-
bedding of the watermark, this method does not introduce
visible artefacts. The algorithm consists in dividing the im-
age into 8 × 8 blocks. Setting the LSB of each pixel to zero
and then calculating a DCT (discrete cosine transform) for
each block. The DCT matrix is quantified with the quantiza-
tion matrix corresponding to a 50% JPEG quality. The result
is encoded using only 64 bits and the code is inserted into
the LSB of another block. The watermarked block must be
suﬃciently distant from the protected block to prevent si-
multaneous deterioration of the image and the recovery data
during local image tampering. The quality of the recovered
regions of the image is somewhat worse than a 50% JPEG
quality, but suﬃcient to inform the user of the original con-
tent of these areas. The same authors propose an alternative
method, which enables the quality of the reconstructed im-
age to be slightly improved. In this variant, two LSBs are used
for embedding the encoded quantified DCT coeﬃcients (i.e.,
128 bits can be used instead of 64 bits). For most blocks, 128
bits are enough to encode almost all quantified DCT coef-
ficients. In this way, the quality of the recovered regions is
roughly equivalent to a 50% JPEG compression, but due to
the modification of the two LSBs, the watermarked image
quality is worse.
Themajor drawback of this method is that the embedded
information is not robust. If several distinct regions of the
image have been tampered with, the recovery data may also
be corrupted. Indeed, after global modifications of the image
such as filtering or lossy compression, most reconstruction
data will be erroneous as LSB values are changed by this kind
of operation.
2.3. Semifragile watermarks
A semifragile watermark is another type of authentication
watermark. Semifragile watermarks are more robust than
fragile watermarks and less sensitive to classical user modifi-
cations such as JPEG compression. The aim of these methods
is to discriminate between malicious manipulations, such as
the addition or removal of a significant element of the image,
and global operations preserving the semantic content of the
image.
The use of such methods is mainly justified by the fact
that images are generally transmitted and stored in a com-
pressed form. Moreover, for the majority of the applications,
the losses due to the compression process do not aﬀect the
integrity of the image within the meaning of its interpreta-
tion.
2.3.1 Semifragilemethods robust to JPEG
compression
Lin and Chang [4] propose a semifragile watermarking algo-
rithm that accepts JPEG lossy compression and rejects ma-
licious attacks. They have highlighted and shown two in-
variance properties of DCT coeﬃcients with respect to JPEG
compression.
The first property shows that if we modify a DCT coeﬃ-
cient to an integral multiple of a quantization stepQ′m, which
is larger than the steps used in later JPEG compressions, then
this coeﬃcient can be exactly reconstructed after JPEG com-
pression.
The second is an invariant relationship between two ho-
mologous coeﬃcients in a block pair before and after JPEG
compression. Because all DCT coeﬃcients matrices are di-
vided by the same quantization table in the JPEG compres-
sion process, the relationship between two DCT coeﬃcients
of the same coordinate position from two blocks will not be
changed after the quantization process. The only exception is
that strict inequalities may become simple equalities due to
quantization.
The authentication system proposed by Lin and Chang is
based on those two properties. The first one is used to embed
the signature and the other is used to generate the authenti-
cation bits. The steps of embedding and authentication can
be summarized as follows.
Algorithm 2a (generation of authentication bits).
(1) Divide the original image into 8 × 8 blocks;
(2) form block pairs using a predetermined secret mapping
function;
(3) for each block pair (p, q):
(i) select a set Bp of n DCT coeﬃcients;




1, Fp(υ) − Fq(υ) ≥ 0,
0, Fp(υ) − Fq(υ) < 0,
(2)
where υ ∈ Bp, F(υ) is the value of υ;
(iii) embed the authentication bits according to Algorithm
2b (embedding process).
The binary signature is then partly embedded into each
of the two blocks of the pair. For instance, if the sig-
nature length is 8 bits, each block has to embed 4 au-
thentication bits. The embedding process is relatively sim-
ple. It consists in defining an equality relation between the
LSB of preset DCT coeﬃcients and the bits of the signa-
ture.
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Algorithm 2b (embedding process).
(1) Select a set Ep, of n/2 DCT coeﬃcients, where Ep ∪ Bp =
∅;

























where sign(x) = 0 if x < 0, 1 otherwise.
The authentication process consists in first extracting the
authentication bits from the watermarked areas of the image
and using them to verify whether the DCT coeﬃcient rela-
tionships in the signature match the predicted criteria. If they
match, the image is considered authentic. If they do not, this
means that either block, or possibly the two blocks, of the
considered pair has been manipulated.
The authors have proposed some improvement such
as recovery bits. The advantage of these overhead bits is
twofold. On the one hand, they allow an approximation of
the original block to be reconstructed, on the other hand they
help to locate precisely the zones of the images which were
really faded (i.e., to raise the ambiguity of the identification
of the altered blocks). The recovery bits are generated from
a down-sampled and compressed version of the original im-
age. They are then embedded into 4 blocks. The embedding
process of recovery bits is similar to that of authentication
bits.
2.3.2 Block-basedwatermark
Block-based watermarking techniques consist in dividing the
image into blocks of about 64 × 64 pixels and inserting a
“robust” mark into each block. To check the integrity of an
image, the authenticator tests the presence or absence of the
mark in all blocks. If the mark is present with a high prob-
ability in each block, we can aﬃrm that the tested image is
authentic.
The variable-watermark two-dimensional technique
(VW2D) described by Wolfgang and Delp [9, 10] is based on
the principle described previously. A binary watermarkW(b)
is embedded in each block b of an image X . Like Van Schyn-
del et al. [15], the authors recommend to use m-sequences
[16] to generate the mark. The use ofm-sequences is justified
by the fact that they have excellent auto-correlation proper-
ties, as well as a very good robustness with noise addition. To
generate the watermark, a binary sequence is mapped from
{0, 1} to {−1, 1}, arranged into a suitable block, and then
added to the image pixel values:
Y(b) = X(b) +W(b), (4)
where X is the original image, and Y the watermarked image.
The verification process used to test if an image Z is au-
thentic consists in computing a statistic score d (6) based on






A(i, j)B(i, j), (5)
δ(b) = RYW (b) − RZW (b), (6)
where Z is the tested image (the watermarkW is supposed to
be known).
If d < T , where T is a user-defined threshold, the tested
block is considered genuine. While modifying the value of T ,
one tolerates more or less significant changes in the image.
It is then possible to refine detection by defining several
thresholds corresponding to several levels of block degrada-
tion (e.g., unaltered, slightly altered, very altered, completely
changed).
However, in practice, thismethod oﬀers only a limited in-
terest insofar as it is necessary to store at least, for each block
b of an image, the result of the correlation between the wa-
termarked block Y(b) and the watermarkW(b).
Fridrich [17, 18] proposes a similar technique. To pre-
vent unauthorized removal or intentional watermark dis-
tortion, the author recommends to make the mark depen-
dent on the image in which it is embedded. The binary
mark used corresponds to a pseudo-random signal gener-
ated from a secret key, the block number and the content of
the block represented with anM-tuplet of bits. Each block is
then watermarked using O´ Ruanaidh spread spectrum tech-
nique [19]. The author claims that the watermark is fairly
robust with respect to brightness and contrast adjustment,
noise adding, histogram manipulation, cropping, and mod-
erate JPEG compression (up to 55% quality). These water-
mark properties enable us to distinguish malicious manipu-
lations from visible nonmalicious changes due to common
image processing operations.
2.3.3 Feature-basedwatermark
The basic idea of this method [20, 21] consists in first extract-
ing features from the original image, and hiding them within
a robust and invisible watermark. Then, in order to check
whether an image has been altered, we simply compare its
features with those of the original image recovered from the
watermark. If the features are identical, this will mean that
the image was not tampered with, otherwise the diﬀerences
will indicate the altered areas (Figure 2).
The choice of image features used will directly aﬀect the
type of image alterations that we wish to detect. Addition-
ally, those features will depend on the type of image un-
der consideration (paintings, satellite images, medical im-
ages, and so on). The features are typically selected so that
invariant properties are maintained under weak image alter-
ations (lossy compression) and broken for malicious manip-
ulations. These features could be also used to partially restore
the tampered regions of the image. Typical features used to
provide image authentication are edges, colours, gradient, lu-
minance, or combinations of these features.
















Figure 2: Generic semifragile watermark scheme: (a) Image secu-
rity. (b) Authenticity verification.
A number of constraints are imposed by this method,
mainly in terms of robustness and storage capacity of the
signature. Robustness is required in order to allow lossless
extraction of the watermark. The accuracy of the detection
and the amount of information inserted into the image are
directly related. It is necessary to find a good compromise for
the size of the signature so that both robustness and accurate
detection can be achieved.
One of the problems faced by this method is that the im-
age is slightly modified while inserting the watermark. Even
slight image variations may aﬀect the image properties. Thus
since the features of the original image and the watermarked
image are not exactly the same, there are risks of false pos-
itive detection. This risk may be more or less important ac-
cording to the choice of selected features. In order to solve
this problem we have implemented an iterative watermark-
ing algorithm. The idea here is to sign the image, extract fea-
tures from the newly obtained image, and then repeat the wa-
termarking process on the original image (in order to avoid
cumulating distortions) using the newly computed features.
This iterative process enables hidden features to perfectly co-
incide with the protected image features. In practice, three
iterations are enough.
2.3.4 Other approaches
Other techniques are studied or investigated. Kundur and
Hatzinakos [22], and Lin and Chang [23] propose wavelet-
based image authentication. The principle of the Lin and
Chang method consists in first choosing a wavelet basis and
a pseudo-noise pattern (e.g., a 16 × 16 pixels pattern spa-
tially repeated in the horizontal and vertical directions) se-
lected according to a secret key. The image is then decom-
posed into four sub-bands, LL, LH, HL, and HH, using the
previously designated wavelet basis. The HH subband is sub-
stituted by the pseudo-noise pattern. Lastly, the watermarked
image is obtained after applying the inverse wavelet transfor-
mation. Note that the embedding process changes only the
HH subband of the image (i.e., high frequencies) and that
it does not introduce important visual degradation to the
image.
The authentication process is based on the detection of
the presence of the embedded pseudo-noise pattern. The first
step consists in extracting the HH subband. The extracted
subband is then convolved with the pseudo-noise pattern.
If the image was not manipulated, the convolution result
should be like a dot matrix. In the opposite case, the distri-
bution will lose its uniform character in the areas where the
image was tampered with. The authors point out that their
method is robust with some filtering operations such as blur-
ring and edge enhancing, and with a soft JPEG compression.
On the other hand, the authors do not show the robustness of
their method versus specific attacks such as the substitution
or preservation of the HH watermarked subband. In other
words, is the choice of the wavelet basic as secret, suﬃcient
to avoid this type of attack?
2.4. Summary of differentmethods
We summarize the diﬀerent methods presented in this arti-
cle in Table 1 below. The class to which each method belongs
is indicated: fragile, semifragile, digital signature, as well as
the type of authentication data used, the authentication data
support, the objectives regarding integrity (i.e., strict or con-
tent), and whether the method oﬀers a possible localisation
and/or reconstruction of the areas tampered with.
By analyzing this table, we can notice that generally the
fragile watermarking methods allow only a strict integrity
service, whereas the semifragile watermarking methods and
the methods based on external signature guarantee a content
authentication. However, the fragile watermarking methods
remain the simplest to implement.
It is also interesting to notice that only few methods are
currently able to restore, even partially, the tampered regions
of the image.
3. MALICIOUS ATTACKS
Our aim in this section is not to develop a list of all the pos-
sible malicious attacks that an image authentication system
can overcome, but to show some of the most frequent at-
tacks. The common objective of these attacks is to trick the
authentication system, in other words, to show that an image
as authentic even though its content has been modified (or
sometimes, the opposite). Some of these attacks look triv-
ial and easy to avoid; nevertheless, it is very important to
take them into account when developing an authentication
algorithm.
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Table 1: Summary of methods ensuring an authentication service.
Method Class Mark1 Cover Integrity2 Localisation Reconstruction
Yeung and Mintzer [11] fragile predefined logo no pixels strict yes no
Walton [12] fragile checksums yes LSB strict yes no
Fridrich and Goljan [14] fragile image comp. yes LSB strict yes yes
Wong [24] fragile hash function yes LSB strict yes no
Lin and Chang [4] semifragile DCT coef. yes DCT content yes yes
Wolfgang and Delp [9] (1) semifragile m-sequences no pixels content yes no
Rey and Dugelay [21] semifragile luminance yes IFS content yes yes
Fridrich [17, 18] semifragile block-based yes pixels content yes no
Kundur and Hatzinakos [22] semifragile random noise no wavelets strict yes no
Lin and Chang [23] semifragile random noise no wavelets content yes no
Queluz [25] signature edges yes external content yes no
Bhattacharjee and Kutter [6] signature interest points yes external content yes no
Lin and Chang [7, 8] signature DCT coef. yes external content yes∗ no
Wolfgang and Delp [9] (2) signature hash function yes external strict yes∗ no
1indication whether authentication data is dependent on the image or not.
2 indicating sensitivity to JPEG compression.
∗ ambiguity in locating areas that have been tampered with.
One of the most common attacks against fragile water-
marking systems consists of trying to modify the protected
image without altering the embedded watermark, or even
more common, trying to create a new watermark that the
authenticator will consider as authentic. Take the following
simplified example: the integrity of an image is insured by
a fragile watermark, independent of the image content, em-
bedded in the LSB of its pixels. We easily see that if wemodify
the image without taking account of which bits are aﬀected
by this manipulation, we will most likely degrade the water-
mark and therefore the attack will be detected. On the other
hand, if we alter the image without modifying the LSB; the
watermark will remain as it was, and the authentication pro-
cess will not detect any falsification.
In general, when the integrity of an image is based on
by a mark that is independent of its content, it is possible to
develop an attack that could copy a valid watermark of one
image into another image. By doing so, the second image be-
comes protected even though the second image is false. This
attack can even be performed over the same image. First, ex-
tract the watermark from the image; thenmanipulate the im-
age, and finally reinsert the watermark on the altered image.
This process will cheat the authentication system.
Following the same philosophy, the Collage-Attack pro-
posed by Fridrich et al. [26] creates a falsified image from
parts of a group of images protected by the same authentica-
tor using the same mark and the same key. This attack does
not assume a priori any knowledge about the hidden binary
watermark, or the secret key. Its principle is relatively easy
since it replaces each pixel of the altered image by the closest
pixel value of equal coordinates of the images in the base. The
main diﬃculty of this method lies on obtaining a database of
images rich enough to obtain a falsified image of good visual
quality.
Another classic attack tries to discover the secret key used
to generate the watermark. This kind of attack, also called
Brute Force Attack, is very well known by the security com-
munity. Once the key has been found, it is very easy for a
“hacker” to falsify a watermark of an image that has been
protected by this key. The only way to counter this attack is
to use long keys to dissuade the attacker from trying to dis-
cover the key, because of the high cost of computing time.
Lastly, it is interesting to notice that protocol attacks are
also investigated. In [27] Radhakrishnan and Memon pro-
pose an attack against the image authentication system SARI
[28]. The authors show that the image digest of the SARI sys-
tem is not secure under certain circumstances. Specifically, if
an attacker has the image digests for a multiple number of
images where the same secret key has been used to generate
the digest, he is able to cause arbitrary images to be authenti-
cated. The authors propose several countermeasures to over-
come this attack.
4. CONCLUSION
The increasing amount of digital exchangeable data gen-
erates new information security needs. Multimedia docu-
ments, and specifically images, are also aﬀected. Users ex-
pect that robust solutions will ensure copyright protection
and also guarantee the authenticity of multimedia docu-
ments. There is such a strong demand for image manipu-
lation techniques and applications that they are becoming
more and more sophisticated and are accessible to a greater
number of people. An unfortunate consequence of this is
that new specialized counterfeiters have appeared. Image wa-
termarking, although being a very recent field of research,
can propose complementary counterattack methods to the
classical cryptographic ones. Its approach grants priority to
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the content authentication more than to the strict digital
integrity.
In the current state of research, it is diﬃcult to aﬃrm
which approach seems most suitable to ensure an integrity
service adapted to images and in a more general way to mul-
timedia documents. There does not exist, for the moment,
any solution perfectly answering this problem. Fragile wa-
termarking methods are very sensitive to the slightest dete-
rioration of the image, but they oﬀer only a strict integrity
service, relatively far from users’ needs. Nevertheless, the ad-
vantage of fragile watermarking techniques, compared to the
methods classically used in security, is that they allow a pre-
cise localisation of the manipulated areas. However, the cur-
rent tendency is more and more towards the use of semifrag-
ile methods. These methods are much more tolerant in re-
spect of nonmalicious manipulation, such as a good qual-
ity JPEG compression. This flexibility is made possible partly
due to watermarking algorithms designed with specific ro-
bustness criteria (i.e., the mark is resistant only to certain
well-defined manipulations), and also to the use of invari-
ant authentication data to modification preserving the se-
mantic content of the image. The use of a mark dependent
on the image content allows, on the one hand, to increase
the robustness of the method in respect of malicious attacks,
such as the Collage-Attack, and on the other hand, a possi-
ble partial repair of the altered areas, according to the chosen
features.
Generally speaking watermarking research lacks of a rig-
orous theoretical framework until now. But, follow some
empirical results already available, very recent works dealing
with theoretical aspects of watermarking appear within the
community. In [29], Martinian et al. present one informa-
tion theoretic formulation of the multimedia authentication
problem. They highlight a link between multimedia authen-
tication and a wide array of powerful results from signal pro-
cessing and information theory. They examine in particular
the use of error-correcting codes in authentication.
Additionally, digital signature methods oﬀer an interest-
ing alternative to classical watermarking techniques, insofar
there is no longer a limitation in terms of capacity, nor a
problem of robustness, thus oﬀering better localisation of the
manipulated areas, better quality reconstruction, and a lim-
ited risk of false alarms.Moreover, there is already a high level
of expertise in the area of community security. However, the
major drawback of these techniques is that the image alone
is not self-suﬃcient. Therefore, the benefits of watermarking
are reduced and it becomes necessary to be able to guarantee
the authenticity of the image/signature pair. Moreover digital
signature methods are not very practical to use with multi-
media documents. Finally, future developments should not
exclude methods based on the combination of robust wa-
termarking and external signature methods. Watermarking
would just be an identifier which would allow a trusted user
access to the registered signature [30].
Before concluding, it is interesting to point out that
even though current methods designed for image integrity
may not be perfect, technical demonstrations [28, 31] and
commercial products, software and technical material are
already available to the public. The most recent and com-
plete R&D (Research and Development) demonstration is
without any doubt SARI (self-authentication and recov-
ery images) which is based on a semifragile watermark-
ing technique [4]. SARI is able to detect malicious ma-
nipulations, such as crop-and-replacement, and approxi-
matly recover the original content in the altered areas.
Another important feature of SARI is its compatibility
to JPEG lossy compression within an acceptable quality
range. The main commercial products are: the DSS sys-
tem from Kodak [32] (Digital Signature Standard, standard
recognized by the National Institute of Standards and Tech-
nology, http://www.itl.nist.gov/fipspubs/by-num.htm), the
IAS system (Image Authentication System) from Epson
http://www.epson.co.uk/, Veridata from Signum Technolo-
gies http://www.signumtech.com/, Eikonamark from Alpha-
Tec Ltd http://www.alphatecltd.com, Mediasign from Me-
diaSec http://www.mediasec.com, and PhotoCheck from
AlpVision http://www.alpvision.com. Kodak and Epson sys-
tems are directly integrated into their digital cameras in or-
der to protect images as they are digitized. The applica-
tions covered by these products are multiple. They range
from image authentication for expert needs, to the protec-
tion of digital documents, for example, images from security
video cameras, in the event that they may be used in court.
AlpVision and Signum Technologies propose more original
uses such as reinforcing the security of paper documents,
for example, passports or badges by watermarking their ID
pictures.
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